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Abstract
All individuals belong to a social network with certain qual-
ity level. This paper analyzes the role of the quality of the social
network in the educational decision making process. We propose
a measure for quality of network based on the schooling level and
the labor position of the members of the net. Our analysis com-
pares individuals who are similar in at least two characteristics:
socioeconomic level and intellectual ability. Although they be-
long to the same type of community (poor), they di⁄er in the
composition of their social network. The higher the quality of
the network, the higher the probability of investing in education.
Hence, socially disadvantaged and equally intelligent individuals
may end up acquaring di⁄erent schooling levels..
1 Introduction1
It is well known that the level of family income play an important role
in determining the amount of human capital investment that an individ-
ual is willing to undertake. Although public education is free in many
countries at basic and medium level of schooling - there is no fee - and
relatively cheap at the superior level, there are other costs like transport,
food and clothes, among others, that poor families cannot a⁄ord. Be-
sides, credit markets are incomplete and exclude most of the low income
potential applicants.
What we can observe in cities like Cali (Colombia) and many others
in LatinAmerica, is that young poor people tend to leave school much
1I would like to thank my supervisor Erik Schokkaert for his invaluable guidance.
I am also grateful to Roc￿o Vera and Lorena Collazos from Universidad Icesi for
their contribution to the discussions and the ￿eld work. I also thank my colleague
Koen Decancq for his useful comments.
1earlier than wealthier individuals. In Cali, the lack of attendance rate
among youngsters from 18 to 26 years old is around 82% in the poorest
neighborhoods (eastern and mountainside areas), while for the wealthier
zone the rate is 50%. In the case of 11-17 years old youngsters, the rates
are 19% and 10% for the poorer and the wealthier areas respectively
(Zuluaga and Benitez, 2010). Perhaps what is driving the poorer to
skip school is a belief that, either way, investing or not in schooling,
good jobs will be given to the wealthier. This belief may discourage the
decision maker to attain higher levels of education, as he believes the
instrumental value of education is low.2
This paper aims at exploring the existence of an additional factor
in￿ uencing the educational investment decisions, i. e. the social net-
works3 that individuals belong to. Social network theory goes beyond
traditional researches in which the individual￿ s social and economic deci-
sions are only determined by individual traits. Instead, network theory
states that both personal characteristics and links with the members of
the social network are important determinants of individuals￿behavior
and decisions.
One example of this in￿ uence is the impact of social networks in
altering the incentives that individuals have to acquire education. In
particular, we state that the ￿quality￿ of the network in￿ uences the
perceived returns to education, encouraging or discouraging individu-
als￿investment in additional years of schooling. For our purpose, we
de￿ne the ￿quality￿of a social network as determined by the schooling
level and links with the labor market of the network￿ s members or ties
(e.g. family members, neighbors, colleagues, friends, classmates, teach-
ers, among others). It is worth mentioning that the term "quality" is
used here as an attribute (ascribable) of the network, which is not re-
lated to the value of the individuals belonging to the network. In this
sense, the meaning of quality that we use here is close, in nature, to the
meaning that Becker and Lewis (1973) and other authors used in their
papers referring to children·s quality, which is di⁄erent from referring
2Education has both intrinsic and instrumental value. The ￿rst refers to the
value of acquiring knowledge itself and the second refers to the positive in￿ uence
of education on (among others) the capacity of individuals to get higher economic
positions. If the individual experiences higher opportunity cost of schooling and lower
chances to get a good job compared to an equally educated wealthier person, this
a⁄ects his perception of the instrumental value of education.
3There is no a standard de￿nition of social network in the literature. Jackson
(2005) de￿nes it as the group of people ￿with whom we share information and favors
on a regular basis￿ . According to Requena (2003), a social network is a set of social
actors linked to each other through a number of relationships with properties like
intensity of the relation, position of the actor inside the network, and accessibility
of the actor with respect to the others.
2to the value of a son or a daughter. In their context, a child￿ s quality is
a combination of endowment (inheritance) and household expenditure
on the child. Having clari￿ed this important point, the quotation marks
for the word quality will not be used any more in the text.
There are no previous works that focus on de￿ning quality of net-
works. It is more usual to ￿nd de￿nitions of the quality of a tie referring
to the strength of the relationship (Granovetter (1983)). Our de￿nition
of network quality is associated with the idea that certain characteristics
of the members of the network may (positively or negatively) in￿ uence
the individual￿ s behavior and decisions. Perhaps other members￿at-
tributes besides schooling and occupational position are also important
to capture this impact, however, this paper will only focus on these two
characteristics. Specifying a method to estimate network quality will
allow us to empirically verify the in￿ uence of networks on the schooling
investment, or any other socioeconomic achievement. In this analysis,
the impact of parents￿characteristics is separated from the e⁄ect of the
rest of members of the network. The idea is to check the in￿ uence of
networks, after controlling for parental background.
It is possible to ￿nd individuals belonging to the same community
or neighborhood, who share certain attributes like family income and
ability, ending up at di⁄erent schooling levels, expected future income
and expected social mobility. The analysis of social networks may o⁄er
us an attractive hypothesis to explain this phenomenon and to explore
why policies of educational expansion favor only a small portion of low
income individuals.
This paper proceeds as follows. The second section corresponds to
the literature review, where previous contributions about the in￿ uence
of social interactions on schooling investment are brie￿ y reviewed. In the
third section of the paper, it is made explicit how the social network qual-
ity a⁄ects educational investments of individuals. The network￿ s quality
has a potential relevant e⁄ect on the individuals￿perception of the re-
turns to education, which in turn in￿ uences their educational decisions.
We propose a speci￿c measure for the quality of social networks, whose
information requirements are: i) quality of each member of the network,
based on educational level and labor position, and ii) the weight of each
member.
An important de￿nition is the ￿key tie￿ . This is a concept charac-
terizing a non-relative member of the network who plays a decisive role
in determining the overall quality of the social network. A key tie is
an initially weak tie (under the kinship criterion) who turns up to be
a strong tie if we adjust his weight by factors like closeness, intimacy,
economic support and admiration. Although the concepts of weak and
3strong ties are commonly used in the literature of social networks, there
is no consensus on their precise de￿nition. We do not pretend to be
more accurate in de￿ning the concepts here, instead, we adopt an or-
dering for strength of ties originally based on kinship: family (stronger),
friends and acquaintances (weaker), and subsequently modi￿ed by the
mentioned adjustment factors (closeness, intimacy, economic support
and admiration). These adjustment factors may lower the weight of
originally strong ties and could make a weak tie become a key tie.
The fourth section corresponds to the empirical calculations. Exist-
ing databases do not allow us to determine the members of an individ-
ual￿ s network, nor their characteristics. In order to obtain the required
information for measuring the network quality of a group of individuals,
a survey was carried out. This survey was applied to a target group
and a comparison group. Individuals in both groups are similar in their
intellectual ability and socioeconomic conditions - they live in the same
type of poor neighborhood -. Those in the ￿rst group have continued
studying after secondary school whereas those in the comparison group
have not. Through the survey, we ￿nd out the schooling level and the
labor position of each member of the individuals￿network in order to
estimate the quality of the network. We then specify a Logit model to
test the in￿ uence of the network quality on the decision of individuals
to continue studying, controlling for parental background and network
size. The information captured through the survey is valuable because it
helps us to determine the appropriate reference group likely to in￿ uence
our individuals￿decisions. The last section gives some conclusions and
recommendations.
2 Literature Review
The existing economic literature on social networks and their e⁄ects on
problems resolution, decision making process and socioeconomic achieve-
ments levels is very extensive. There is also a vast literature on the
formation of networks and their e¢ ciency and stability conditions (See
Jackson (2003, 2005) for a good review). Given the rich nature of social
networks, studying their characteristics with no other goal is already
very interesting academically. Yet, this paper will not focus on how
social networks are established nor on their nature, but on how they
in￿ uence the educational investment decisions.
Social networks play a relevant role in many economic situations:
market labor interactions, risk-sharing loans in underdeveloped areas,
research and development, trade agreements, among others. In the case
of risk - sharing loans, Fafchamps and Lund (2003) explore the relevance
of networks in the ability of households to face adverse shocks. In the
4same line of research, Dercon (2001) and Bold and Dercon (2009), ana-
lyze social networks as an informal group-based mechanism or strategy
of households to managing risk and coping with adverse shocks.
In the case of the networks￿impact on the labor market, Calvo-
Armengol and Jackson (2005) argue that the probability for an individ-
ual to get a job is a function of his network￿ s size (quantity of ties) and
the labor position of the members of his network, through whom he ac-
quires information about available jobs. In the same line, Contreras et
al. (2007) stress the social network as an e⁄ective channel, not only to
￿nd a job, but also to guarantee the good quality of those jobs. In their
paper, social network is empirically de￿ned as the average outcome (em-
ployment rate) of people living in the same neighborhood, ￿nding that
the network helps the woman in ￿nding more easily salaried jobs, whose
quality is higher than self-employment occupations.
Another group of previous studies contributes to the analysis of net-
works by exploring how individuals learn from each other through the
social interaction. These contributions are crucial to our analysis, since
they make reference to the so-called role models, who in￿ uence the de-
cision making process on schooling, among other things. For instance,
Benabou (1993) presents a model relating the choice of neighborhood,
schooling, decisions and e¢ ciency issues, where the assumption of hu-
man capital spillovers plays a fundamental role. The more people with
high schooling level in a given neighborhood, the easier it is for a young
inhabitant to pursue any educational goal. In this context, the e⁄ect of
social networks is twofold: the more high skilled adults in the neighbor-
hood, the higher the possibilities for an individual of having information
on good labour positions. Moreover, those high skilled adults act as role
models, revealing the value of education.
In addition, Overman (2002) explores the neighborhood e⁄ects on
schooling dropout rates. The author ￿nds that the educational level
of inhabitants of the large neighborhood - coverage area of the school
where the individual is enrolled - in￿ uence the dropout rate, because it
is related to the structure of the local labor demand. Moreover, the low
socioeconomic background of the inhabitants of the immediate neigh-
borhood - where the individual￿ s household is located - increases the
likelihood of dropping out. The previous suggests that the spatial scale
of neighborhood e⁄ects goes beyond the socioeconomic level of the im-
mediate neighborhood.
Table 1 shows a few contributions to the discussion about the in￿ u-
ence of social interactions on educational decisions that were relevant
to our own purposes. They are based on the idea that the perceived
returns to education are in￿ uenced by the characteristics of people with
5whom the schooling investment decision makers interact and/or cohabit
in a common geographical space.
The studies by Calvo-Armengol and Jackson (2005), Anderberg and
Andersson (2007), and Moizeau et al. (2004) are exclusively theoretical,
while Yamauchi (2005) and Streufert (2000) also present an empirical
analysis relating social interactions and schooling investment decisions.
Yamaushi uses a farm household panel corresponding to the beginning
of the Green revolution in India (where new technology arrived). He
shows that schooling is positively correlated with income di⁄erences be-
tween educated and uneducated households, and that the strength of
such in￿ uence depends on the schooling distribution of parents￿gen-
eration. This is due to the intergenerational externalities to schooling
investment in children: schooling distribution of parents in￿ uences the
agent·s learning speed or response to returns signals. The previous sug-
gest that educational decisions are determined by social learning, which
is in￿ uenced by neighborhood e⁄ects. The author·s results allow him to
conclude that heterogeneous neighborhoods (mixed educated and uned-
ucated adults) are more appropriate for youth to learn about schooling
returns, hence, they make better schooling decisions.
Streufert calibrates a model of underclass social isolation to test the
hypothesis that isolation depresses educational investment. He assumes
that i) role models shape individuals￿perception of the incremental ben-
e￿t of an additional year of schooling, and ii) underclass youth observe
a sample with no high-income role models. Isolation is modeled by
truncating the sample above with respect to the income variable, i.e.
eliminating the high income observations at each level of schooling. The
isolation simulation corroborates the conjecture. However, a theoreti-
cal counterexample shows that social isolation does not always reduce
schooling because it has two contrary e⁄ects. First, it decreases the per-
ceived additional income that higher schooling would bring and, second,
it reduces the perceived forgone income while attending school, which
makes school more attractive. Thus, isolation reduces schooling only if
the reduction on the perceived additional income that schooling brings
is big enough to overcome the reduction in the perceived forgone income.
The reviewed studies compare groups of individuals from di⁄erent
communities with di⁄erent socioeconomic levels. In this paper we intend
to compare groups inside the same type of community, i.e. poor. These
individuals, in spite of belonging to the same type of neighborhood,
partially di⁄er in the composition of their social network. This type of
focus, applied to schooling decisions, constitutes a contribution to the
existing economic literature on social networks.
It is worth noting that there are no previous studies trying to mea-
6Table 1: Some previous work on the in￿ uence of social interac-
tions on schooling investment
Y : Income, S: Years of schooling, R: Social Network,
￿: Returns to education, i: individual.
Author Channel Main idea
Calv￿- Social The higher the S level of R￿ s members,
Armengol Networks (R) the higher i￿ s expected ￿. Sensitivity
and Jackson of i￿ s decisions w.r.t. R￿ s composition
(2005) determines perpetuation of inequality.
Moizeau et al. "Information Children form their idea on ￿ from
(2004) e⁄ect" experiences of older generations.
neighborhood Segregation makes individuals from poor
neighborhoods be misinformed about ￿,
lacking incentives to invest in S.
Anderberg Social Social environment is the only
and environment channel transmitting intergenerational
Andersson success. If i￿ s neighbors have good
(2007) positions (high wages), i perceives
higher ￿ and invest more in S.
Streufert Social Poor youths lose high income role
(2000) isolation models: they observe a distribution of
of low Y truncated above. Truncation shifts
classes schooling back, since the perceived
incremental bene￿t of each additional
year of schooling shifts down.
Yamauchi Social learning In a Bayesian model of learning, i learns
(2005) and about ￿ by observing the Y level of her
neighborhood neighbors. People decide on schooling
e⁄ects restricted by subjective uncertainty on ￿.
Durlauf Incentives & Parents· election of neighborhood
(1996) aspirations determines role models who in￿ uence
aspirations & expectations of children,
and available funds to ￿nance S in the
community.
7sure network quality. Our interest to measure it is justi￿ed at least for
two reasons: i) in order to compare the di⁄erences in quality among indi-
viduals with similar socioeconomic and intellectual traits and, however,
di⁄erent schooling attainments, ii) in order to count with a variable that
can be used as explanatory in a regression to analyze the determinants
of di⁄erent socioeconomic achievements.
Another set of studies useful to this paper￿ s purpose are those re-
lated with the strength of ties or relative importance of the members
of a network. What is the appropriate method to assign a weight to
each member of the network? How to consider factors that, besides kin-
ship, in￿ uence the weight of a member? Available literature sheds little
or no light on this problem. However, to help ordering ties according
to their strength, there are important contributions especially by Gra-
novetter (1983) and Marsden and Campbell (1984). Granovetter (1983)
suggests that "the strength of a tie is a (probably linear) combination
of the amount of time, the emotional intensity, the intimacy (mutual
con￿ding) and the reciprocal services which characterize the tie". Mars-
den and Campbell (1984) were inspired by this intuitive de￿nition, going
further in the e⁄ort to empirically test the best indicators for strength.
They argue that a measure of closeness or emotional intensity of the
relationship is the best indicator of the strength of ties, in comparison
with other suggested measures like "breadth of discussion topic" and
mutual con￿ding. They emphasize that measures related to time spent
in a relationship like frequency and duration of contact are no good in-
dicators of the tie￿ s strength, since they overestimate the strength of
neighbors/coworkers and relatives respectively.
In addition, Marsden and Campbell analyze how accurate it is to
assume that relatives are strong ties and neighbors/coworkers are weak
ties, concluding that, although the assumption is accurate, the results
also show that "the combined ability of the predictors to account for
strength is limited". Hence, they recommend focusing on closeness when
determining strength of ties. In this paper, we use the information ob-
tained through a survey, from which it is possible to ￿gure out the appro-
priate reference group and the closeness of individuals with each member
of their networks.
2.1 The role of the network quality on schooling
decisions
In this section we are going to describe the mechanism through which
the social network quality in￿ uences the educational decision-making
process of individuals. Let us think of a group of agents living in a poor
8neighborhood.4 One characteristic of this type of neighborhood is the
lower average schooling and income levels of its inhabitants, compared
to non-poor neighborhoods. In spite of sharing the same neighborhood,
the social network R that each agent belongs to is not the same for all
of them ￿although they inevitably do share part of their network.
The fact that individuals do not choose their family and, at a young
age, do not choose their place of residence and school either, makes
their network, at least in a good part, exogenous. Let Ri be the social
network of individual i. There is a quality level associated to each social
network. R
q
i expresses that individual i belongs to a social network of
quality q. De￿nition 1 (below) explains more precisely how to determine
the quality of a network.
In our analysis, individuals share at least two characteristics: they are
intelligent (enough to participate at high educational levels), and they
come from disadvantaged social backgrounds. They have not chosen
their neighborhood.
Individuals decide the amount of educational investment they want
to undertake (S). Their perception of the returns to human capital
investment (￿) is a fundamental determinant of this decision. It is pro-
posed that the perceived returns to education that individuals form are
closely related to the nature of their social network. Thus, the perceived




Where X corresponds to other factors a⁄ecting the perceived school-
ing returns.
Why would individuals care about the characteristic of their role
models? Would not be enough to consider only their own ability and
other characteristics of themselves in order to form their perceptions on
educational returns? It is not di¢ cult to defend the idea that a ratio-
nal individual would take more information into account when deciding
schooling investment. The reason is that the individual does not know
with certainty if the e⁄ort he should exert when studying will be su¢ -
ciently compensated. Thus, the rule for the investment decision is:
if ￿i >Ei + ui ! Investment takes place
￿i <Ei + ui ! No Investment takes place
4Although it is possible to ￿nd non-poor people living in poor neighborhoods,
here the focus is on low income individuals living in poor neighborhoods.
9i.e. if the perceived schooling returns are greater (lower) than the
e⁄ort (E) individuals should exert (plus a stochastic term u), they will
(not) continue studying.
As a rational individual, he considers all information at hand when
making the schooling decision. The characteristics of his role models or
members of his network, what the individual observe of his role model￿ s
outcomes (success or failure), are part of this relevant information.
Equation (1) is pointing out a speci￿c mechanism where social net-
works play a key role in information transmission among the network￿ s
members. Why does the quality of the social network a⁄ect the perceived
returns to education? There are several potential reasons for this kind
of in￿ uence. Let us mention three: expected attainable jobs, expected
future income, and aspirations.
First, the social network is a job connections source. An individ-
ual belonging to a low quality network may (perhaps correctly) believe
that his chances to get a good job are lower than someone with better
connections, which discourage him from investing in education. In the
literature (see for instance Contreras et al. (2007)), it is well-recognized
that the structure of an individual￿ s social network determines who gets
certain type of job, and the individuals￿incentives to continue investing
in schooling and participating in the labor market.
Calv￿-Armengol and Jackson (2004) describes the job information
mechanism as follows: if an agent gets information about an open job po-
sition and has already an employment, then the agent randomly chooses
an unemployed acquaintance to give the information of the job. The
links with the labor market of the individuals￿social network in￿ uence
the individual￿ s probability of getting a job.
Second, individuals have an idea about the relationship between ed-
ucation and income, which is based on what they observe from the sam-
ple of individuals accessible to them, i.e. their role models. Thus, if an
individual belongs to a low quality network, his perception of the incre-
mental bene￿t of an additional year of education would be based on a
sample that excludes high income observations at each schooling level.
The in￿ uence of the network quality on schooling decisions might also be
described in terms of the perceived costs of dropping school. Individuals
from high quality networks may have a more accurate perception of the
di⁄erence between (monetary and non-monetary) earnings of educated
people (their high quality role models) with respect to uneducated people
(average individual in their neighborhood). As a consequence, a young
individual belonging to a high quality network perceives a higher cost of
abandoning school - thinking of the education "premium" - compared







Figure 1: Perceived Returns to Education. These returns might be
thought in a broad sense, for they do not only correspond to the ex-
pected monetary bene￿t of education (or any other instrumental value
of education), but also to the intrinsic value or the value of knowledge
itself.
Finally, a poor person belonging to a low quality network may fail
in detecting how education will positively a⁄ect his welfare, which pulls
down his educational aspirations. This aspiration trap arises because
they have few opportunities to experience how educational choices in￿ u-
ences their well-being,5 not only through the higher expected earnings
but also through other non-monetary impact channels of education. In
general, the quality of the social network has an in￿ uence on the mo-
tivation level of individuals towards educational investment. Attending
school requires an e⁄ort that only su¢ ciently motivated individuals are
willing to exert. Achievements of high quality role models enhance indi-
vidual￿ s motivation and willingness to exert e⁄ort, since he feels encour-
aged by the possibility to catch up with his high quality role models.
Individuals from low quality networks (Rl) form a perception of the
returns to education that is lower than the perception of individuals from
high quality networks (Rh), and that will not always increase with years
of education. Figure 1 illustrates this point.6 The return function of
individuals from lower quality networks becomes ￿ at for high schooling
levels.
5Heifetz and Minelli (2006) quote Appadurai (2004) arguing that a poor individ-
ual is less conscious of the relation between "their fundamental aspirations and the
available commodities". One reason is that poor people have "fewer opportunities to
experience how a choice of a commodity in￿ uences their fundamental well-being".
6The di⁄erence in the quality of the social network may also in￿ uence the indi-
viduals ·expected probability of failure in educational achievements.
11There is an additional characteristic of the social network that may
in￿ uence the perceived schooling returns: the size. The rationale for
this in￿ uence is the information transmission. In fact, larger networks
imply a higher number of role models to compare to each other, wider
information to be used by the decision maker when forming his expecta-
tions about the returns to schooling. The size is relevant when thinking
of the network as a mechanism for information transmission of available
jobs, as Calv￿-Armengol and Jackson (2004) pointed out. The empirical
model in the next section includes this variable as explanatory, given its
potential role for more intensive information ￿ ow.
2.2 Quality of networks
Let rix 2 Ri be i￿ s role model x, where Ri = fri1;ri2 :::rimg denotes i￿ s
social network. The length of vector Ri determines the network size or




ix is the quality of i￿ s role model x.7 The value associated to rq
re￿ ects the educational level and links with the labor market of a net-
work￿ s member, where 0 < rq ￿ 1. The closer rq is to 1, the higher the
quality of the role model. Thus, the quality of the network will depend
on the quality of the role models.
Each rix may have a di⁄erent weight (￿x) in determining the quality
of the social network, which will be denoted by R
q
i. The weight depends
on the relative importance of the members in the network. There are
di¢ culties in determining the relative importance of members though,
since this is a subjective matter guided by emotional attachments, power
relationships, among other factors. We will work out later the determi-
nants of the weight.
De￿nition 1 (Quality of a network) Let each rix have a weight ￿x.
The quality of a network is denoted by R
q










where ￿ 2 [0;1],
Pm
x=1 ￿x = 1 and 0 < R
q
i ￿ 1.
In general terms, we propose that the higher the quality of the net-
work, the higher the schooling level of the individual. The empirical
model in the next section will test the impact of quality network, mea-
sured as proposed here, on the probability for an individual to continue
studying after secondary school.
7Recall that, as mentioned in the introduction, the term quality as used here, has

















Figure 2: Summarizing the in￿ uence of the quality of networks on edu-
cational decisions.
2.3 The decision
Let Si = 1 if individual i reaches high educational levels, Si = 0 oth-
erwise. We want to show that the probability that Si = 1 increases
with the quality of the network . As explained above, a high quality
network o⁄ers advantages to the individuals such as higher information
on the true bene￿ts of additional education, enhancement of motivation
to study and higher capacity to aspire, among others.
Figure 2 summarizes the process through which the quality of the
network in￿ uences the individual￿ s decisions on education. From the
center of the ￿gure to the left, each individual i belongs to a social
network with quality q (R
q
i). His network is composed by m individuals,
each of them with a given quality r
q
ix. The weight of each member
is denoted by ￿x (section 4:2: describes the de￿nition of weights). The
weighted sum of the quality of the members determines R
q
i (de￿nition 1).
In turn, the quality of the network is a variable a⁄ecting the perceived
returns to education ￿ of individual i. The higher the expected return to
education, the higher the probability of deciding to invest in schooling.
Individuals base their schooling investment decisions on the expected
educational returns and the e⁄ort they would have to exert for acquiring
a given level of education. As mentioned, an individual will be willing
to invest in education only if the perceived schooling returns are greater
than the e⁄ort he should exert, plus a stochastic term u. In other words,
P(S = 1) = P[￿(R
q
i; Xi) ￿ Ei > ui]
Assuming a logistic distribution function, we may work out a Logit
model in order to verify the potential in￿ uence of network quality on the
likelihood of investing in education.
13The Logit model has the following form,
P(S = 1jR
q
i) = ￿(￿0 + ￿1R
q
i + X￿) (3)
where X is a vector compiling other variables that might a⁄ect the
schooling decision, such as number of siblings and size of the network
(social background and ability are similar for all individuals). Parental
background is controlled by including the schooling level and labor po-
sition of parents. ￿1 is expected to be signi￿cant and positive. The net-
work size is expected to have a positive in￿ uence on schooling as well,
since larger networks allow individuals to have more information when
setting up their expectations on the returns to schooling, by comparing
the relative situation of their di⁄erent ties.
Key ties and quality of networks
Individuals living in a poor neighborhood may di⁄er in the quality of
their social network, hence, in their perceptions about ￿. Consider indi-





Sharing the same neighborhood makes it likely for i and j to share some
of the role models of their networks. However, there might be at least
one role model rix 2 Ri who does not belong to Rj and makes the di⁄er-
ence. We claim that the presence of at least one high quality member -
i.e. r
q
ik is close to 1 (0:9 or higher) - with high enough ￿ may positively
in￿ uence the educational decision. We call this member a ￿ key tie￿or
￿ key role model￿ .
The key tie or key role model crucially helps in determining the qual-
ity of the social network. A key tie has two characteristics i) (s)he is
a no-family member8 high quality tie, , and ii) his weight ￿, initially
lower than those of relatives, ends up being as high or higher than orig-
inally stronger ties due to di⁄erent adjustment factors (e.g. intimacy,
admiration, emotional or economic support), that will be explained in
section 4:2. The key tie is crucially helping in enhancing motivation,
aspirations, and in general, non-cognitive skills of the individual.
For individuals living in a poor neighborhood, strong ties (family,
closest friends) are likely to be low-educated, so there might be some
cases in which a weak tie turns up to be a key tie, pulling up the network￿ s
quality and in￿ uencing individual decisions.
This is important in the context we are analyzing. Our individuals
share the same type of poor neighborhood. Their strong ties are nor-
mally of similar characteristics. If poor and/or low-educated people only
8The reason why a key tie is de￿ned as a non-family member is that we are
referring to a network member who may eventually counterweight the in￿ uence of
low educated strong ties (parents and close family).
14interact with their equally disadvantaged strong ties, the possibility of
widening their life perspectives is lower. Granovetter (1983) points out
that "the heavy concentration of social energy in strong ties has the
impact of fragmenting communities of the poor into encapsulated net-
works with poor connections between these units". The problem with
these encapsulated social networks is that poor individuals lose the po-
tential advantages of wider information received through their weak ties￿
own networks, which may be, according to the author, "one more rea-
son why poverty is self-perpetuating￿ . The argument is that weak ties
are a richer source of information on vacancies than strong ties, because
they connect di⁄erent groups in a social space, providing the individual
with no redundant information, while strong ties most probably have no
di⁄erent information than the individual already has.
In some cases, admiration for someone di⁄erent to our strong ties
may exert an important role in shaping our behavior.9 In this sense,
the presence of one or several high quality members in the network can
be as important as the schooling level of the parents. Hence, it is not
necessary that poor individuals observe many high quality role models
(a complete reference group) in order to change their fate, a key tie may
su¢ ce. Besides, the link might be undirected (i belong to j￿networks
and j belongs to i network) or directed (i belongs to j￿ s networks but j
does not belong to i￿ s). The last one is possible, since someone we know,
admire and interact with may likely in￿ uence our behavior, with no
reciprocity. These type of links are commonly identi￿ed in the network
literature.
4. Data and results
4.1. The Survey
￿Given that identi￿cation based on observed behavior
alone is so tenuous, experimental and subjective data will
have to play an important role in future e⁄orts to learn about
social e⁄ects￿(Manski 1993)
We applied a survey to individuals divided in two groups. The ￿rst
group (64) is composed by university students - ￿rst year scholars at
9Weak ties refers to acquaintances and excludes media personalities. Members
of the network are those with whom there actually exists some type of personal
interaction. Media personalities might in￿ uence behavior - for instance, a national
tennis champion may encourage youngsters to enroll to tennis schools - but we can
hardly claim that they belong to the social network of all individuals who admire
them. Moreover, they most probably are equally ￿ accessible￿for everyone in a poor
neighborhood.
15Universidad Icesi (Cali, Colombia) - coming from poor neighborhoods.
These students are admitted based on their academic performance, ac-
quiring also a scholarship. They also have to prove that their economic
conditions are low enough to qualify for the scholarship. Family income,
neighborhood and other characteristics are corroborated by a committee
to approve the bene￿t.
The second group (35) is a sample of individuals similar in ability
and socioeconomic background to those in group 1, but not enrolled
(nor planning to enroll) in superior education programs. We made sure
that the reason for individuals from group 2 not to continue studying
after secondary school was not lack of intellectual ability. We did it by
checking their school grades and results from the National test to access
higher education (ICFES),10 which were similar to those of individuals
from group 1.
In order to form group 2, individuals from group 1 were asked for
references from young acquaintances with the following characteristics:
1) poor neighborhood inhabitants and low family income, 2) (intellectu-
ally) capable to continue higher education, 3) not enrolled - no planning
to enroll - in any higher education program. We contacted them and
selected those who were indeed similar in socioeconomic and academic
traits to group 1 individuals. Although group 2 is not to be considered
as a control group, it serves to compare their members￿network quality
with those from group 1, who have the opposite educational choice. In
our case, the choice is whether to continue or not higher schooling.
We are aware of the potential problems of this sampling procedure,
related to the potential sources of endogeneity. It is worth clarifying
that at least one source of endogeneity is excluded i.e. students going
to college have, in average, better network quality not precisely because
they go to college. The reason is that we have interviewed students
from the ￿rst year and asked them for their friends and close people,
excluding those appearing after college. We should recognize, however,
that there might be another source of endogeneity. For instance, unob-
servable personality factors that in￿ uence both schooling decisions and
network￿ s quality. Speci￿cally, the simultaneity problem may arise be-
cause certain factors a⁄ecting the individual￿ s outcome also impact the
outcomes of other agents in the network. We deal with this problem in
the next subsection.
The survey helped us detect, i) educational level and labour position
of each of the members of the individual·s network. Table 7 in the
10The speci￿c grade of each individual was not registered. We only made sure that
they had good school performance (outstanding or excellent) and that the ICFES
test results were at the upper 30% at a national level.
16appendix shows the quality values (from 0 to 1) attached to the actual
schooling or job level. The quality of a tie (r
q
ix) corresponds to the
average of these two quality values. ii) the weight of each member (￿x),
by considering the di⁄erent adjustment factors as explained in the next
subsection. Based on i) and ii) we were able to calculate the quality of
the social network for all individuals in our sample, according to equation
(2).
The social network is composed of parents, siblings, closest cousins,
closest aunts and uncles, closest family in law, closest friends, closest
professors, godparents, sentimental partners, closest neighbors, closest
mates from associations or organizations, and relevant acquaintances.
An advantage of the survey used for this research is that it helps us
to accurately determine the relevant reference group of individuals, this
is, people potentially in￿ uencing behavior and decisions. Note that the
survey does not only ask for family or closest friends, but also for profes-
sors and acquaintances that somehow (in many cases due to admiration)
have served as role models.
Table 2 provides some descriptive information on the quality of the
network for both, the target and the comparison group (See the questions
of the survey in appendix 2).
Table 2: Characteristics of the networks￿members
Target Group Comparison Group
Mother Father Rest Mother Father Rest
SCHOOLING (%)
Non education 0.0 0.0 0.4 8.0 12.5 3.1
Less than secondary 22.6 19.7 8.3 52.0 37.5 23.4
Secondary 31.0 28.8 29.8 24.0 16.7 37.6
Studying higher educ 25.0 10.5
Technic/ Technology 23.9 21.3 6.5 8.0 20.9 5.5
University 21.1 27.3 27.4 8.0 12.5 19.3
Graduate 1.4 1.5 2.5 0.0 0.0 0.7
OCCUPATION (%)
Unskilled job 29.3 45.8 18.9 33.3 82.6 45.1
Technic/ Technologic 22.4 20.8 5.8 3.7 4.3 4.0
Skilled job 19.0 33.3 31.2 3.7 13.0 21.2
Housewife 29.3 9.8 59.3 20.9
Student 34.2 8.8
174.2. The weights
Each individual i belongs to a network with m role models, where the
number of models might di⁄er among individuals. A role model x has
a weight ￿x, when determining R
q
i the quality of the network. We have
that ￿ 2 [0;1] and
Pm
x=1 ￿x = 1.
There are basically three categories of role models: relatives (r),
friends (f) and acquaintances (a). In principle we assume that ￿ is higher
for family, followed by friends and ￿nally acquaintances. However, there
are certain factors like intimacy or closeness, emotional support, ￿nan-
cial support, admiration, con￿dence, among others, that make ￿ di⁄er
among the members￿subsets of family, friends and acquaintances. For
instance, admiration may enhance the weight of apparently weak ties
(acquaintances). An appropriate de￿nition of ￿x might reveal cases in
which parents background may loose importance in in￿ uencing individ-
uals￿decisions.
In order to calculate R
q
i, we use three ways to assign the weights to
each member of the network. First, a uniform weight for all members
￿x_uniform = 1=m (4)
Second, a weight adjusted by kinship, considering the three identi-
￿ed categories, relatives, friends, and acquaintances. Then, kinship is
considered a relevant adjustment factor (af1) for the uniform weight.
￿x_kinship = ￿x_uniform ￿ (1 + af1) (5)
In order to operationalize (5), a numeric value for af1 is required. It




1, i.e. that the adjustment
factor is the greatest for the relatives and the lowest for the acquain-
tances. However, with the available information, there is no formal way
to estimate this kinship adjustment factor. We then assume arbitrary
small values to apply to ￿x_uniform, afa
1 = 0, af
f
1 = 0:5, and afr
1 = 1.
Giving di⁄erent values to af1 does not imply relevant changes in the
results shown in the next section.
Third, the weight is adjusted by other factors such us economic sup-
port, emotional support, con￿dence, and admiration. We assume that
all factors alter the weight in the same proportion, with af = 0:5. This
means that, in the case of a network￿ s member for which all four adjust-
ment factors apply, we will have,11
￿x_adjusted = ￿x_kinship ￿ (1 + 4af) (6)
11The weights have been renormalized so as to make them sum to one.
18Equations (5) and ( 6) are intuitively reasonable. However, the em-
pirical application may seem rather ad hoc, since the only alternative to
operationalize the weights is assigning an arbitrary small value to the
adjustment factor. However, the exercise is worth doing because uniform
weights ignore the higher relevance of certain members of the network
who potentially in￿ uence an agent￿ s decisions.
With the purpose of verifying that the results are robust, we run the
Logit model with three di⁄erent calculations of the variable quality of the
network. The three calculations follow de￿nition 1, but they di⁄er in the
weight (￿) applied to each member of the network (lets us call them R,
R2 and R3). R was calculated using ￿x_adjusted, R2 was calculated using
uniform weights for all members and R3 using ￿x_kinship. The quality of
network appears to be signi￿cant with the three types of calculations.
4.3. Results
We calculated the quality of the network (R
q
i) for each individual that
participated in the survey, by using equation (2). Figure 3 shows the
histograms of the quality corresponding to group 1 (above), group 2 and
the complete sample. It is observed that the frequencies for group 2 are
more concentrated below the value 0:5, while the bars for group 1 are
located mainly to the right of 0:5. Those individuals who have continued
their studies after secondary school, belong, in average, to higher quality
social networks.
Besides the quality of the network, we have to include in the vector X
other variables that may in￿ uence the decision to continue studying after
secondary school. Recall that at least two of the relevant variables are
similar for the two groups, since all individuals belong to the same type
of socioeconomically disadvantaged neighborhood and posses around the
same level of intellectual ability. The control variables considered are
size of the network (m, number of ties), number of siblings, gender and
parental background. The last variable is an index from 0 to 1, calculated
in the same way as the quality index, giving an equal weight to both
parents. Table 3 shows the mean of the independent variables. We
observe that individuals in the target group have in average a higher
number of members in their social network, and 0:5 less siblings than
the individuals in the comparison group. As it can be already deduced
from table 2, the mean of the parental background index for the target
group is higher than the mean for the other group.
As mentioned before, it is necessary to deal with the potential endo-
geneity problem. The usual procedure is to use instrumental variables.
For instance, Contreras et al. (2007) use neighborhood housing prices
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Figure 3: Histograms, Network Quality.
Table 3: Mean of the variables
Parents Size of network # of siblings
Target group 0.582 24.7 1.7
(0.229) (8.4) (1.0)
Comparison group 0.318 17.1 2.2
(0.218) (6.2) (1.3)
20is not suitable in our case, because housing prices should be quite sim-
ilar among all individuals in the survey, given that individuals live in
the same type of neighborhood. Even if some heterogeneity in prices
existed due to di⁄erences in size of the house, that information is not
available to us. We suggest an alternative instrument in this paper: a
dummy variable equal to 1 if the individual belongs to a cultural, reli-
gious, or communitarian group, and equal to 0 otherwise. Belonging to
those groups reveals the ability of individuals to socialize - expanding
their network beyond their socially disadvantaged strong ties - and it is
unrelated to the decision to continue studying or not.
The next step was running the test of Hausman to detect endogeneity
by using the suggested instrument. The coe¢ cient for the residuals
in the second stage is not signi￿cant, which means that the suspected
endogenous variable - the network quality - is exogenous and we may
trust the results of the Logit Model (3).
Table 4 shows the results. Contrary to what we expected, the co-
e¢ cient for number of siblings - although it has the expected negative
sign - is not signi￿cant to explain the probability to continue superior
studies, nor is the individual￿ s gender (Column (1)), which left us with a
simpler model whose results appear in the columns (2). The coe¢ cient
for network quality has the expected positive sign and it is signi￿cant.
The average marginal e⁄ect indicates that the quality of the network
does increase the probability of an individual to continue studying after
secondary school. Even controlling for parental background, the quality
of the network is important in explaining our dependent variable.
The size of the network appears to be also important to explain
schooling decisions. This is expected since a higher number of (relevant)
role models allow individuals to compare the situation of their di⁄erent
ties and have more information when forming their expectation on the
returns to schooling. A bigger size of the group may re￿ ect the presence
of role models beyond the family members, which gives an individual the
possibility of acquiring non redundant information, through ties linking
di⁄erent social spaces (Granovetter (1983)).
As table 4 shows, conclusions from the results do not vary when we
use di⁄erent measures of quality: R, R2 and R3, explained in subsec-
tion 4:2. Still, the network quality coe¢ cient and the marginal e⁄ects
are higher using R.12 We consider these results (using R) better than
those obtained by using R2 and R3, because they take into account
a theoretically superior measure of network quality, which involves the
adjustment factors explained above in order to determine the weight of
12The statistical di⁄erence between the marginal e⁄ect for R and R2 is not signif-
icant though.











Parents B 3.745 3.730 4.386 3.631
(1.655) (1.650) (1.591) (1.648)
0.529 0.526 0.632 0.526
netw size 0.145 0.145 0.150 .141
(.0516) (.0515) (.0503) (.0506)







_cons -7.799 -8.045 -7.337 -7.602
(2.216) (2.029) (1.980) (1.934)
LRX2 47.46 45.43 42.99 45.17
Prob>X2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Log lik = -31.59 -32.62 -33.83 -32.75
PseR2 0.429 0.411 0.389 0.408
* Non signi￿cant
Standard errors in parenthesis
22each tie.
Two additional estimations were made as sensitivity analysis in or-
der to compare the previous results with more conventional regressions,
not involving the network quality index. Instead, average schooling and
labor position of the network￿ s members and parents were used as ex-
planatory variables. Results are shown in table 5.
First, the schooling dummy was regressed on parent￿ s schooling (SP)
- taking the highest level between the mother and the father - and the
average schooling of the members of the network (SN) (column (1)).
Second, we use as explanatory variables two dummies re￿ ecting labor
position of parents and the social network. D1 is equal to 1 if the mode
of the labor position of the network￿ s members is non-skilled job, zero
otherwise. D2 is equal to 1 if both parents have a non-skilled job (or
if one parent has a non-skilled job and the other does not work), zero
otherwise (column (2)).
We can observe that the two social network variables (SN and D1)
are relevant to explain the probability for individuals to continue study-
ing after secondary school, even after controlling for parental back-
ground. These results correspond to a simple social mobility model,
where the signi￿cance and sign of the coe¢ cients indicate whether there
is upward or downward social mobility with respect to the parents and
network position.
4.4. Key ties
The information obtained through the survey is explored in further de-
tail, in order to identify key ties such as described in section 3:3. A key
tie is a high quality non family member of the network crucially helping
in determining the quality of the social network.
As mentioned, we found that the quality of the network for individ-
uals in the target group is in general higher than for individuals in the
comparison group (Figure 3). Likewise, the average quality of the fam-
ily members is higher. For instance, 21% (27%) of the mothers (fathers)
of individuals in the target group have university education, while only
8% (13%) of the mothers (fathers) of individuals in the control group
obtained a university degree (See table 2 above). This indicates that in
several cases, strong ties are playing a decisive role in determining the
high quality of the network (parents, siblings, uncles, aunts, cousins).
However, there are also several cases where non-family members play
an important role. 53% of individuals in the target group have at least
one high quality non-relative member of the network with more than one
weight adjustment factor applying. We found that 38% of individuals
23Table 5: A simple Social Mobility Model
(1) (2)
SN 0.6182 D1 -1.5081
(0.3232) (0.6239)
marg e⁄ 0.0923 marg e⁄ -0.2270
SP 0.2487 D2 -1.5665
(0.1019) (0.6611)
marg e⁄ 0.0371 marg e⁄ -0.2219
netw size 0.1550 netw size 0.1614
(0.0519) (0.0487)
marg e⁄ 0.0231 marg e⁄ 0.0237




Log lik = -32.62 -37.66
PseR2 0.411 0.319
* Non signi￿cant
Standard errors in parenthesis
have a key role model, this is, a non-relative high quality member of
the network whose weight, thanks to the adjustment factors, ended up
being as important or more than the weight of family members. These
key ties are, in most of the cases, teachers, friends or family friends.
It is interesting to notice that teachers may play a relevant role in
an individual·s network. Table 6 shows the percentage of cases where a
teacher￿ s weight had to be adjusted. The adjustment was more frequent
for teachers in the network of group 1 individual compared to group 2.
The average number of teachers in the network for each individual was
2:6 (1:7) for group 1(2).
Interaction with people di⁄erent to their strong ties has apparently
widened individuals￿life perspectives. A less encapsulated social network
allows the potential advantages of positive in￿ uence from high quality
role models.
5. Conclusions and some recommendations
This paper explores the role of the network quality on the schooling
decisions of individuals. We want to show that, beyond socioeconomic
background, individuals with higher quality of network - compared to
their peers living in the same type of neighborhood - will experience
24Table 6: Adjustment factors to the weight of teachers
# of adjustment % of






No teacher in the network 1.6 11.1
higher probability to continue studying. Speci￿cally, the network qual-
ity in￿ uences the perception of individuals on the returns to education,
which determines the probability to continue higher education.
We compare two groups of people belonging to the same type of
poor neighborhood and with similar intellectual ability. The di⁄erence
between them is that individuals in the ￿rst group have continued study-
ing after secondary school, while those in the comparison group have not
continued. A survey was applied to individuals of the two groups in order
to obtain information about the quality of their social networks.
A measure for quality network is proposed, based on the weighted
sum of the qualities of the network￿ s members. The quality of role models
is related to their schooling level and their position at the labor market.
As for the weight of each member, it is considered that the type of
relationship (relative, friends or acquaintances) is not su¢ cient criterion
to determine it. Other factors such us intimacy, con￿dence, emotional
and economic support are relevant and may convert an initially weak tie
into a key tie.
Social networks are important in shaping the motivation, aspirations
and expectations of individuals. These, in turn, a⁄ect the behavior and
decisions of people in crucial aspects such as investment in human cap-
ital. It suggests, in line with the existing literature, that educational
achievements of members of poor communities may generate a multi-
plicative e⁄ect, through social networks, beyond the private return of
the educated individual.
Results of the Logit model suggest the relevance of the quality of
the network in schooling decisions, controlling for parental background.
This might be one of the reason why it is possible to ￿nd individuals
belonging to the same type of community or neighborhood, who share
certain attributes like family income and ability, ending up at di⁄erent
levels of schooling, expected future income and expected social mobility.
25If we accept that social networks matter, a relevant question could be
then: how can the quality of networks for individuals in poor neighbor-
hoods be strengthened? Let us mention (not develop) some strategies
towards that direction. The two last strategies do not follow directly
from the analysis of this paper. Still, they are mentioned for their rele-
vance to improve the network￿ s quality of impoverished individuals.
- We have seen that, in several cases, the positive in￿ uence of a
teacher plays an important role in shaping individuals behavior. From
the target group, 17% (22%) of the individuals had teachers whose weight
was adjusted by 4 (3) factors. There should be some mechanisms to
strengthen the relationship teacher-students to better exploit this chan-
nel of positive in￿ uence.
- Cities must o⁄er more spaces to be indistinctly used by people from
di⁄erent income groups. Cities in Colombia are designed to promote po-
larization, which decreases the opportunities for poor youth to expand
their social networks, losing the potential advantages of higher informa-
tion received through possible weak ties. At least from the government
initiatives, this practice should be reversed in order to avoid segregation.
- Social housing (viviendas de interØs social) should not be con-
structed in isolated places, as it is usual in Colombia. It is important
that they are integrated to the city so that inhabitants may bene￿t from
the infrastructure of the city and may easily socialize.
- Students from high quality private universities have more chances
to engage in the labour market, because of the good networking and
prestige of the academic programs. Education in Colombia is polarized
and poor students normally are excluded (not in theory but in prac-
tice) from private universities. Thus, good students from public schools
should be guaranteed a given number of undergraduate scholarships in
high quality private universities. This should not reduce the opportunity
for them to access the scarce current scholarship o⁄ers.
- A more ambitious but highly bene￿cial proposal is that at least one
member of each family should bene￿t from a scholarship to cover the
complete educational cycle. This member will have a positive incidence
in the whole family group.
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28Appendix
The survey
The following information was obtained from parents, siblings, cousins,
uncles, aunts, relatives in law, Godmother, Godfather, friends, family
friends, sentimental partners, school teachers, neighbors, people from
groups or associations, other relevant people not included before. All
the information is about the closest people at each category. There are
cases where individuals have relevant relationships with nobody in some




3 Level and year of education
4 Occupation
5 Frequency of Contact (daily, weekly, monthly, etc.)
6 Type of contact (personal, virtual, phone)
Once the previous information was registered, we ask the individual
from (to) whom of those listed in the survey she/he:
7 receives economic support
8 asks him/her for advice
9 gives him/her advice
10 receives emotional support
11 admires him/her















Note: This quality value allocation re￿ ects the so-called sheepskin
e⁄ects that has been pointed out in the literature of returns to
education. According to this concept, there are higher increments
in the returns in those years of schooling that represent the culmi-
nation of an educational level. The jump in returns is higher for
complete universitary education (Gonzalez et al. (2004)).
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